Introduction
The assumption that both domestic politics and international relations are characterised by an original condition of anarchy, which can only be regulated by the artifice of a formal social contract and a system of sovereign states, underpins much of modern political thought and IR theory, especially the realist tradition (Murray 1997: 31-143; Rengger 2000: 37-71; Bell 2008) . In the wake of Kenneth WaltzÕ Theory of International Politics (Waltz 1979) , the neo-realist claim about uncertainty and the permanent risk of inter-state conflict has been challenged by both neo-liberal thinkers and theorists of constructivism. The former tend to emphasise the varieties of cooperative behaviour between states as part of international institutions (e.g. Keohane 1984 ; Keohane and Nye 1989) . Meanwhile, the latter tend to accentuate inter-subjectively shared ideas that shape action by constituting the identities and interests of both state and non-state actors (Wendt 1992 (Wendt , 1999 Keck and Sikkink 1998; Reus-Smit 1999 Finnemore 1996; Barnett and Finnemore 2006) .
It is true that neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism differ fundamentally on key questions such as the nature of the international system, the extent to which states are driven by national interest and whether identities are exogenously given or socially constructed. However, as this essay will suggest, they also share a number of foundational assumptions, including (1) the existence of anarchy not only in the state of nature but also in the international system; (2) the individual and the state as the key units of domestic politics and international relations; (3) the separation of ideational from material forces and a residually dualist ontology (oscillating between the self and the other). By contrast, there are elements of the English School of IR Ð in some of the writings by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight Ð that provide an alternative conception to the three dominant discourses, notably (1) the existence of order both in the state of nature and in the international system; (2) the primacy of communities, groups and other associations over the individual and the state; (3) the fusion of ideas with material forces and a more fully relational ontology.
This paper argues that one source for this alternative conception is the work of Edmund Burke who viewed political association as more primary than anarchy and as naturally given (in the sense of reflecting a natural order) rather than socially constructed. Wight himself hinted at the importance of BurkeÕs intellectual legacy for the English School of IR in his seminal essay ÔWhy is there no international theory?Õ, where he writes that Òthe only political philosopher who has turned wholly from political theory to international theory is BurkeÓ (Wight, 1966: 19) . Both in his speeches and writings Burke articulates a new approach to the political and the international that focuses on the primacy of association: cultural and social bonds that are more primary than the social contract or the inter-state system. Such ties involve reciprocal rights and mutual duties Ð Ôobligations written in the heartÕ (Burke 2014b : 316) Ð which Burke viewed as more fundamental than formal legal or procedural arrangements as expressed in treaties (or, arguably, much of international law today).
Contrary to certain strands in constructivism, Burke considers associative ties not as socially constructed but rather as reflecting a natural order governed by custom, tradition and the experience of connectedness in which communities and groups embody the political and social nature of humankind. Such an order is reflected in their participation in a Ôcommonwealth of nationsÕ that is governed by a transcendent morality given to humanity by God (Burke 1993c) . And contrary to more ÔculturalistÕ approaches (e.g. Huntington 1996 , and in a very different way, Lebow 2003 , 2009 , Burke views identity not in essentialist terms but instead as an organically evolving reality that is shaped by both ideas and material forces. My argument is that BurkeÕs more ÔorganicistÕ approach avoids both the view that identity is essentialist, fixed and immutable and the notion of identity as fragmented, in flux and permanently changing. Instead, he conceives of being, community and identity in terms of living traditions Ð a covenantal link among generations that connects the past with the present and the future.
Section one explores the conception of association in constructivist and ÔculturalistÕ theories of IR and shows that in each case, there is a dualism between ideas and material forces that reflects a secular logic Ð a separation of immanence from transcendence that underpins an ontology that is ultimately idealist. Section two provides an analysis of BurkeÕs critique of the modern secular settlement before outlining his ÔassociationistÕ alternative and the way in which this approach informed his analyses and actions on the burning questions of international affairs in his day.
Section three discusses a number of possible objections to BurkeÕs approach and tries to show how BurkeÕs associationism contributes to the solution of perennial problems in IR theory, including the reality of human vice, violence and war, before the final section offers some concluding reflections and outlines future avenues of research.
A critique of constructivist and ÔculturalistÕ conceptions of association
The idea of association and culture in politics and international relations is not new, but it has recently come once again to the fore. The argument that human association is more primary than either the sovereign individual or the sovereign state because humankind is always already political can be traced to ancient philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, as well as to medieval and some modern thinkers in Western tradition (Pickstock 2012; Pabst 2016; Rengger 2016) . Over the past two decades or so, the idea of the international as a ÔthickÕ order of interpersonal relations that generate cross-border connections, including language and cultural customs, has received renewed attention in IR by certain strands in the constructivist school (e.g. Wendt 1992 Wendt , 1999 Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ruggie 1998; Reus-Smit 1999 Finnemore 1996; Barnett and Finnemore 2006) . In different ways, they emphasise the role of inter-subjectively shared ideas rather than material forces in shaping political action by constituting the identities and interests of states and other actors in the international arena.
Constructivist accounts of association
The constructivist conception of association derives from an important critique of neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches to the international. As John Gerard Ruggie (1998) and Alexander Wendt (1992 and have argued, the debate between neo-realism and neo-liberalism is an intraparadigmatic one. Both schools of IR view the international system as characterised by anarchy, which is regulated through a combination of structure (distribution of power) and process (institutional interaction).
1 Both are also committed to rationalism and utilitarianism: in the words of Ruggie, Ô[w] ithin the ontology of neo-utilitarianism, ideational factors, when they are examined at all, are rendered in strictly instrumental terms, useful or not to self-regarding individuals (units) in the pursuit of typically material interests, including efficiency concernsÕ (Ruggie 1998: 855) .
Therefore both neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches consider identities and interests to be exogenously given, such that state actors might change their behaviour but not their essential identity or vital interests. As a result, the main disagreement between neo-realists and neo-liberals is about the relative importance of anarchic structure versus process-generated cooperative behaviour as part of the international system. Any association between states is based on a rationalist calculation of (relative or absolute) gains.
Wendt rightly recognises that some (neo)-liberal theorists of IR go further and try to conceptualise forms of Ôcomplex learningÕ (Nye 1987) , Ôchanging conceptions of self and interestÕ (Jervis 1988) , or ÔsociologicalÕ approaches to interest (Keohane 1990 ). However, this raises questions about the tension between an individualist ontology and an inter-subjective epistemology that neo-liberalism cannot resolve because it is wedded to ontological individualism. In light of this,
Wendt argues for an inter-subjective structure that can account for interest-and identity formation in a way that the rationalist separation of exogenously given structure from fluid process cannot.
Key to this is what Wendt calls the distribution of knowledge based on ideas (as opposed to the distribution of power based on material interests) and the Ôcollective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actionsÕ (Wendt 1992: 397) .
Crucially, as he claims in his influential book Social Theory of International Politics (Wendt 1999) , constructivism offers an alternative to neo-realism and neo-liberalism that revolves around two arguments: Ôthat the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by natureÕ (Wendt 1999: 1) . Against the philosophical materialism of the realist tradition in IR, WendtÕs variant of constructivism tries to show that the structures of human association are primarily to do with cultural factors rather than material forces.
And against the philosophical rationalism of neo-liberal approaches, Wendtian constructivism seeks to establish that these culturally conditioned structures not merely regulate action but also build interests and identities. In WendtÕs own words, Ô[a]nalysis should therefore begin with culture and then move to power and interest, rather than only invoke culture to clean up what they leave unexplainedÕ (Wendt 1999: 193) .
Others, like Ruggie, focus on the Ôcivilizational constructs, cultural factors, state identities, and the like, together with how they shape statesÕ interests and patterns of international outcomesÕ (Ruggie 1998: 867) . His argument is that core building blocs of the international system such as sovereignty, power or national interest exist only within a framework of shared meaning that recognises it to be legitimate precisely because underpinning it is some form of collective intentionality. As he notes, collective intentionality creates identity and meaning, including the case of negotiating trade agreements. The reason is Ôintersubjective frameworks of understanding that included a shared narrative about the conditions that had made the [trade] regimes necessary and the objectives they were intended to accomplish and generated a grammarÕ (Ruggie 1998: 870) . So like many other constructivists (including Barnett, Finnemore, Keck, Reus-Smit and Sikkink), WendtÕs and RuggieÕs conceptions rest on the claim that identities and interests change as a result of social interaction Ð in particular the use of language.
But the linguistic turn of IR, which lies at the conceptual heart of constructivism, is not sufficiently developed. As Maja Zehfuss has shown, constructivist depictions of interactions lack communicative action: WendtÕs Ôactors do not speakÕ (Zehfuss 2002: 48) , and the duality between the self (ego) and the other (alter) is in fact devoid of linguistic mediation. Thus actors are engaged in signalling games and in an exchange of discrete moves that resemble rationalist game theory more than continued social interaction based on a properly relational ontology. It is true that Wendt draws on Peter BergerÕs conception of identity, which he describes as relational: ÔActors acquire identities-relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self-by participating in such collective meanings. Identities are inherently relationalÕ (Wendt 1992: 397) . However, the ontology that underpins WendtÕs constructivism and the constructivist tradition of IR more widely is dualistic. Not only does it view the individual and the state as the fundamental units of politics and international relations without the mediation of groups, communities or other forms of association. It also considers ideas as separate from material forces, which alongside institutions are little more than external constraints on socially knowledgeable and discursively competent actors.
The primacy of ideational over material factors implies that constructivism is a variant of idealism: reality is merely physical and given, devoid of any meaning except for the mentally and socially constructed meaning of individuals and their interaction with other individuals. The same is true for norms in the international system, which are but the outcome of states interacting with other states. Underpinning constructivist approaches is the premise that politics and the international system are ultimately composed of individuals and states and that these units have nothing ontological in common. Therefore, the political and the international rest on a relational social structure that is the outcome of ideas and interaction Ð a constructed artifice rather than a naturally given imperfect order that human beings try to discover and to improve.
Thus we can summarise by saying that neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism differ fundamentally on key questions, such as the nature of the international system, the extent to which states are driven by national interest and whether identities are exogenously given or socially 7 constructed. However, they do share a number of foundational presuppositions, including (1) the existence of anarchy not only in the state of nature but also in the international system; (2) the individual and the state as the core units of domestic politics and international relations; (3) the separation of ideational from material forces.
ÔCulturalistÕ approaches to association
Among the most prominent ÔculturalistÕ approaches to IR and the question of association are the works of Samuel Huntington (1996 and and (much closer to social constructivism) the writings of Richard Ned Lebow (notably 2003 Lebow (notably , 2009 Lebow (notably , 2014 . The focus of my critique will be on the latter because, like the constructivist tradition of IR, Lebow rejects the neo-realist assumption that the international is characterised by a condition of anarchy and that states are primarily engaged in the pursuit of national interest. Instead of a rationalist calculation of gain and loss, his contention is that actors in the international system are motivated in much more complex ways and that there is something like a commonwealth of nations bound together by notions of justice. LebowÕs emphasis is on the tragic character of international politics linked to the inherent difficult of establishing and maintaining an orderly conduct among nations, the contingent nature of human efforts to improve the material environment of individuals and states, as well as the fundamental condition of uncertainty, which according to him remains unaddressed in the constructivist work of Wendt and others (Lebow 2003) . This interplay between nature and culture is key to the development of civilisations, their rise and their fall (Lebow 2012 and (Lebow 2003: 161) .
By contrast, international order and a shared sense of justice based on the cultivation of common bonds is central to a nomos that can restrain the worst excesses of actors Ð including individual leaders, city states or entire empires. Such a nomos involves a cultural understanding of the selfimage and self-esteem of other actors on the international stage among whom some shared interests and identities can be discerned.
However, Lebow insists that the human condition is tragic in the sense of being subject not just to uncertainty but also to irreconcilable tension between opposing passions. As a result, both individual and collective identities are fragile and unstable, which in turn implies that persons and societies evolve according to non-linear patterns that are neither determined by fixed factors such as power (as for neo-realism), nor by law-like regularities (as for neo-liberalism), nor by intersubjectivity (as for constructivism). That is so because for Lebow the latter forgets the importance of human interaction with reality or, to put the same point differently, the interplay of nature and culture.
In other works, notably his Cultural Theory of International Relations (Lebow 2009) (Lebow 2009: 514) . Social order at the domestic and international level is in large part a reflection of rival emotions: reason-based arrangements tame spirit and appetite, which leads to self-restraint, while appetite-based arrangements induce selfishness, rapacity and conflict. Spiritbased arrangements involve the pursuit of honour and therefore produce a competition for status, which is also unstable.
Crucially, Lebow argues that such a cultural approach to IR is compatible with certain standard in the social sciences, including generalisation over time and across space:
[b]y identifying roughly where societies reside within [the mixture of motives,] we can infer important things about their politics, including the basis and degree of cooperation, the nature of conflict and the frequency of violence or war, and actorsÕ propensity for risk-taking. With a large number of cases we could determine the distribution of societies across time and cultures to see if certain mixtures of motives were more common and stable than other configurations (Lebow 2009: 510-11) .
Leaving aside the challenge of operationalising this theory, LebowÕs approach runs into a number of conceptual problems. First of all, Lebow is right to treat culture not as an epiphenomenon but rather as a force in its own right that shapes behaviour, but in his theory there is a tension between transhistorical continuities and contingent, contending factors. On the one hand, Lebow emphasises the universal motive of spirit, but on the other hand he privileges change over continuity and human agency over material structure. So is spirit always more important than other emotions and, if so, why? Or does that depend on historical context, which would suggest that even universal motives are subject to contingency.
Connected with this is a second conceptual problem Ð a rationale for why hierarchies of standing and conceptions of honour are more fundamental than other factors in shaping political behaviour. Lebow shows how they emerge from continuous social interactions and are transformed by them, but he fails to account for why they are more central to identity than other factors, such as a sense of belonging. But so far he has not explained why the sources of political order are to be found purely in human nature and social interaction, which rest on the ontological assumption of individual substances rather than relational beings Ð beings in relationship with other beings. Both
Lebow and Wendt assume that the natural and social sciences give us access to a physicalist ontology that grounds both the identities and interests of actors. Thereby they explicitly exclude all non-secular, metaphysical thinking that views relationality as more primary than substance and offers a more ÔorganicistÕ conception of being, community and identity (cf. Pabst 2012). Such a conception suggests that beings are in association with other beings in such a way that community
and identity describe what is Ôwith usÕ beyond the dualism between the self and the other so beloved of constructivists.
As the remainder of the essay will suggest, BurkeÕs more ÔorganicistÕ approach outflanks in advance two conceptions of identity Ð either as essentialist, fixed and immutable or as fragmented, in flux and permanently changing. Instead, Burke views being, community and identity in terms of living traditions Ð a covenantal link among generations that connects the past with the present and the future. As Vincent (1984: 207) rightly remarks, Ôthe more general function of history in BurkeÕs thought [É] was to establish a context by means of which those merely temporary possessors of the commonwealth, the current generations, could be connected up to the past, and also to the future, of their societyÕ. This more relational ontology underpins BurkeÕs argument that the international can be conceptualised in terms of the primacy of association over the individual and the state. The state of civil society is a state of nature; and much more truly so than a savage and incoherent mode of life. For man is by nature reasonable; and he is never perfectly in his natural state, but when he is placed where reason may be best cultivated, and most predominates. Art is manÕs nature (Burke 1791: 108) .
BurkeÕs conception of association

Elements of political theology in
In line with this thinking, Burke views rights as social and relational too, such as the right to property by descent, the right to due process (including trial by jury) and the right to education. In Hatred, and RageÕ (Burke 1993a: 28) . In other words, the artifice of the sovereign state and the state-centric system reinforce some of humankindÕs worst inclinations towards egotism, greed, distrust and violence.
BurkeÕs alternative to anarchy in the state of nature and to dominion in the artifice of political society can be traced to his search for an order in history. Such an order is neither reducible to a competition between sovereigns based on raison dÕŽtat (as in realism). Nor does it take the form of an imposed sanction based on fixed divine or natural law (as in idealism). Compared with these two traditions of theorising, there is a third tradition in which international order is considered to be immanent in the unfolding of history itself, and Burke is one of its principal proponents (Boucher 1991; Fidler and Welsh 1999; Insole 2012) . Beyond empirical realism and rationalist idealism, BurkeÕs close engagement with historical processes shifts the emphasis away from inductive observation and deductive speculation towards reflections on practice Ð on particular customs and habits that are embodied in the traditions of statesÕ associations with others and that reflect certain universal principles of humanity and justice.
This centrality of Ôprincipled practiceÕ is at the heart of his search for a middle path between mere facts without theory (associated with empirical realism) and pure abstraction without practical meaning (associated with rationalist idealism). BurkeÕs characterisation of what distinguishes a statesman from a politician illustrates this well: ÔA statesman, never losing sight of principles, is to be guided by circumstancesÕ (quoted in Boucher 1991: 140); ÔA statesman forms the best judgement of all moral disquisitions who has the greatest number and variety of considerations in one before him, and can take them in with the best possible consideration of the middle result of themÕ (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 39) . In the Reflections, the above-mentioned real rights of men are said to be found Ôin a sort of middle, incapable of definition, but not impossible to be discerned (Burke 2014a: 63 [original italics] ).
In BurkeÕs political theory of the international, the continuous search for a middle path is most clearly articulated in his reflections on BritainÕs mixed constitution, which is a fusion of classical with Christian ideas of sovereignty shared between the people, the Church and the Crown.
Each represents a different principle of government Ð democracy, aristocracy and monarchy Ð and each is represented in Parliament, which in turn sustains the plurality of the political realm. As
Burke explains, this reflects both universal truths in nature and particular arrangements in culture:
the foundation of government is laid, not in imaginary rights of men (which at best is a confusion of judicial with civil principles), but in political convenience and in human nature; either as that nature is universal, or as it is modified by local habits and social aptitudes [É] These doctrines do of themselves gravitate to a middle point [É] That medium is not such, because it is found there; but it is found there because it is conformable to truth and nature [É] the whole scheme of our mixed constitution is to prevent any of its principles from being carried as far as, taken by itself and theoretically, it would go (Burke 1791: 140) .
The fundamental problem with the French Revolution is that it elevates one principle Ð the supposed Ôwill of the peopleÕ Ð over all others and thereby subverts the balance of the mixed constitution in favour of something like democracy by mob rule, which is allied to new forms of oligarchy, anarchy, demagogy and tyranny.
For Burke, the absolutism of the French Revolution violates principles of humanity and justice. Human nature, like politics, is a question of balance between virtue and vice because human beings are capable of both good and evil. Since they are neither perfect nor beyond redemption, the role of institutions is to encourage virtue and to limit vice. Prudence is the Ôfirst of all virtuesÕ (Burke 2014a: 63) and Ôthe God of this lower worldÕ (Fidler and Welsh 1999: 39 within the commonwealth of nations (as the following section will show).
Linking BurkeÕs conception of humanity and justice is his invocation of natural law and divine authority. In his speeches on the impeachment of Warren Hastings, Burke is adamant that there is no such thing as arbitrary power because it is not human will which determines legitimacy but instead God: Ôwe are all born in subjection Ð all born equally, high and low, governors and governed, in subjection to one great, immutable, preexistent law [É] by which we are knit and connected in the eternal frame of the universeÕ (Burke 2009: 478) . Since this law is a gift from God and Ôall power is of GodÕ (Burke 1993c) , it follows for Burke that the authority by which men rule over others is governed Ôthe eternal laws of Him that gave it, with which no human authority can dispenseÕ (Burke 2009: 478) . These Ôeternal laws of justice, to which we are all subjectÕ (Burke 2009: 479) , provide the foundations for Ôthe laws of morality [that] are the same everywhereÕ (Burke 2009: 476) . In other words, there are universal and immutable standards of justice that apply to all people irrespective of their particular culture.
Both Michael Freeman and R.J. Vincent contend that references to God in Burke are less a reflection of theology than a function of sociology. FreemanÕs argument is that BurkeÕs reliance on religion is to do with social utility more than Christian metaphysics (Freeman 1980) . And in the words of Vincent Ôthe legitimacy derived from this [GodÕs] delegation provided the reason for social solidarity instructing the habit of co-operation. But it was in the habitual end of this connection that Burke was chiefly interested: he was a sociologist of religion before he was a theologianÕ (Vincent 1984: 207) . However, these two interpretations do not square with BurkeÕs repeated appeals to God throughout his writings. Beyond mere rhetoric he argues that human beings, despite the Fall and the irruption of evil and sin, are capable of discovering the substance of natural law precisely because it has been mediated in history and through living traditions of wisdom. These cannot be purely man-made, as his distrust of reason and abstract principles clearly suggests.
Instead, for Burke, human beings are creative because they are made in the image and likeness of the Creator. As social and religious animals, we as human beings Ð Burke writes in the Reflections Ð Ôknow, and what is better, we feel inwardly that religion is the basis of civil society and the source of all good and of all comfortÕ (Burke 2014a: 94) . God not only created the universe but also governs its laws through His hand of providence. There is a universal reason that is internal to history, and human beings are able freely to discern its workings and their own destiny.
Crucially, for Burke God is the ultimate source of our being and our capacity for moral action:
If there be a God such as we conceive, he must be our Maker. If he is our Maker, there is a Relation between us. If there be a Relation between us some Duty must arise from that Relation, since we cannot conceive that a reasonable Creature can be placed in any
Relation that does not give rise to some Duty (Burke 1993c: 82) As Boucher (1991) shows, Burke never developed a theory about how to distinguish universal principles from the general precepts of individual nations and cultures, but there is a governing philosophy of practice that emerges from his speeches and writings. Once again the trial of Hastings is instructive: Burke insists that the principle of all power having to be constrained by law can be found in both British and Indian traditions and that all constitutions have rules against arbitrary dominion and abuse of power precisely because they ultimately rest on traditions of wisdom and justice.
I must do justice to the East. I assert that their morality is equal to ours, in whatever regards the duties of governors, fathers, and superiors; and I challenge the world to show in any modern European book more true morality and wisdom than is to be found in the writings of Asiastic men in high trust, and who have been counsellors to princes.
If this be the true morality of Asia, as I affirm and can prove that it is, the plea founded on Mr. HastingÕs geographical morality is annihilated (Burke 2009: 480) .
In summary: far from serving a merely social or sociological function, BurkeÕs references to
God are central to his political conception of the international Ð a covenant between humanity and its Creator that is dimly reflected in covenantal relations among the generations of each nation and between the nations that form a commonwealth. In the words of Burke himself,
We have obligations to mankind at large, which are not in consequence of any special voluntary pact. They arise from the relation of man to man, and the relation of man to God, which relations are not matters of pact. On the contrary, the force of all pacts which we enter into with any particular person or number of persons, amongst mankind, depends upon these prior obligations (quoted in Barth 1960: 34).
BurkeÕs account of association
Central to BurkeÕs account of the international is his conception of human beings as naturally linked to others by bonds of sympathy, which prevent fellow human beings from being Ôindifferent spectators of almost anything which men can do or sufferÕ (Burke 1993b: 68) . Coupled with the passions of imitation and ambition, sympathy helps to produce an order that is not imposed upon some pre-existing chaos but rather emerges from nature. It does so by fusing a concern for others (sympathy) with following the example (imitation) of those who excel and can offer virtuous leadership (ambition). Even though they are Ôof a complicated kindÕ, these three passions Ôbranch out into a variety of forms agreeable to that variety of ends they are to serve in the great chain of societyÕ (Burke 1993b: 68) .
Therefore the key difference between the social contract tradition based on an anarchic state of nature and BurkeÕs emphasis on Ônatural socialityÕ is that the latter evolves with the grain of humanity, starting with the innate desire of human beings to associate with one another. The primacy of association underpins BurkeÕs conception of community as expressed by his famous invocation of the Ôlittle platoonÕ:
To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and to mankind In the intercourse between nations, we are apt to rely too much on the instrumental part.
We lay too much weight upon the formality of treaties and compacts. We do not act much more wisely when we trust to the interests of men as guarantees of their In short, Burke inverts the modern priority of rights and contracts by arguing that the mutual moral obligations of interpersonal relations are more primary than abstract, formal and procedural standards imposed for either state-administrative or market-commercial purposes. The reason is that without such obligations the law will not lead to greater justice in the sense of properly ordered relations (as can be seen today with the lack of trust in public institutions and political processes).
Crucially, for Burke this extends to ties across nominally sovereign states, which suggests there are commonwealths of nations in which the unity of the whole precedes the separateness of the individual parts. Underpinning the unity of each commonwealth are certain cultural traditions and customs. In the case of Europe, these include Ôthe spirit of a gentleman and the spirit of religionÕ (Burke 2014a: 81) , as well as the Roman law of neighbourhood or vicinity. In one sense this law merely reflects the geographical circumstance of proximity in space. But in another sense it also expresses the historical circumstance of cultural connectedness over time, as well as other common factors such as politics, economics and religion. The point for Burke is that the law of vicinity implies mutual obligations:
Now where there is no constituted judge, as between independent states there is not, the vicinage itself is the natural judge. It is, preventively, the assertor of its own rights; or remedially, their avenger [É] . This principle, which, like the rest, is as rue of nations, as of individual men, has bestowed on the grand vicinage of Europe, a duty to know, and a right to prevent, any capital innovation which may amount to the erection of a dangerous nuisance (Burke 2014b: 320) .
The French Revolution was one such ÔnuisanceÕ, which legitimated the intervention by FranceÕs neighbours in order to restore the original commonwealth of nations whose existence had been endangered by the usurping revolutionaries (Welsh 1995) . BurkeÕs reasoning is that the unity of the whole is based on a solidarity between members who are equally free and independent but also equally committed to a substantive order. As Boucher (1991: 143) Besides such embedded freedom, cultural customs and human habits also include social virtues such as generosity (rather than either greed or miserliness), courage (instead of recklessness or cowardice), gratitude, loyalty, fraternity and friendship. was drawn from the old Germanic or Gothic customary; form the feudal institutions which must be considered as an emanation from that customary; and the whole has been improved and digested into system and discipline by the Roman law [É.] From this resemblance in the modes of intercourse, and in the whole form and fashion of life, no citizen in Europe could be altogether an exile in any part of it. There was nothing more than a pleasing variety to recreate and instruct the mind; to enrich the imagination; and to meliorate the heart. When a man travelled or resided for health, pleasure, business or necessity, from his own country, he never felt himself quite abroad (Burke 2014b: 317) .
In the final instance, BurkeÕs vision is not really Eurocentric because Burke repeatedly emphasises the importance of inheritance in all cultural contexts. One of the main reasons for his radical critique of the French Revolution is the revolutionariesÕ disregard for institutions that are ultimately contingent products of specific historical circumstance Ð Ôthe gift of nature or of chanceÕ (Burke 2014a: 161) . While there is an element of arbitrary human artifice involved in establishing institutions, it is nonetheless the case that our institutional inheritance should neither be distrusted nor dismissed. As Hampsher-Monk (2014: xxxv) notes, for Burke, the contrast is not (as it is for the radical) between an arbitrary set of institutions and a better, more rational set, but between having the good fortune to possess stable institutions at all and the anarchy that we risk from rejecting what Ôtime and chanceÕ have given us. Far from its being the case that stable institutions can be deduced from abstract principles, Burke thought that, in the absence of shared conventions Ð which only a specific historical culture provides Ð reason was incapable of deducing any specific arrangements.
The following sub-section explores how BurkeÕs ÔassociationistÕ approach informed his analyses and political actions before the final section discusses a number of possible criticisms of a Burkean conception of IR.
How BurkeÕs ÔassociationistÕ approach informed his analyses and actions
BurkeÕs search for a middle path in international relations, which centres on cultural commonwealths, emerged in his discussions of the main international issues of his day. It also informed his analysis and actions in politics, notably on the question of Catholic emancipation in Ireland and American taxation, the French Revolution, and the British Empire in India. In each case, as this section shows, Burke sought to discern universal principles embodied in particular practices and in the process to develop his distinct theory of political action.
On the Irish question, Fidler and Welsh (1999: 8) (Burke 1993d: 99) . He also denounced BritainÕs popery laws as resting on an Ôerroneous principleÕ: laws Ôagainst the majority of the peopleÕ that represent Ônot particular injustice but general oppressionÕ (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 8) .
BurkeÕs revulsion against oppression runs through much of his writing, and it is of a piece Leave the Americans as they anciently stood, and these distinctions, born of our unhappy contest, will die along with it (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 15) .
Burke also emphasised the interconnectedness of the empire by showing how the American tea embargo (in response to resistance against taxation) jeopardised the attempt to save the East India
Company from financial ruin because it had previously exported tea to America without paying any duties. With his typically acerbic style, Burke remarked that Ôit is the same folly that has lost you at once the benefit of the West and of the EastÕ (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 16) .
Central to BurkeÕs qualified defence of the empire was his emphasis on the common historical and cultural inheritance, which transmitted from generation to generation a series of intertwined principles that should guide policies and be refined through their enactment in political action. The My hold of the Colonies is in the close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges, and equal protection. These are ties which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron [É] the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of this country as a sanctuary of liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith (Burke 2009: 220) .
Once again we can see how it is the transcendent morality given to us by God that underpins BurkeÕs analysis and his actions in Parliament.
BurkeÕs conception of justice based on the principles of liberty and equality also shaped his thinking on BritainÕs crimes against India. For example, in the Ninth Report of the Select Committee, Burke writes Ô[b]efore any remedial law can have its just operation, the affairs of India must be restored to their natural order. The prosperity of the natives must be previously secured, before any Profit from them whatsoever is attemptedÕ (Burke 2009: 427) . Similarly, in the 1783
Speech on FoxÕs East India Bill, Burke launched an extraordinary attack on the prevailing attitude among MPs towards the Indians. He called for restorative justice for the evils perpetrated by the East India Company, which is Ôdemanded from us by humanity, by justice, and by every principle of true policyÕ (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 23) . Attacking the Ôtotal silenceÕ of his fellows
MPs Ôconcerning the interest and well-being of the people of IndiaÕ, he enjoined Parliament to abandon its contemptuous condescension for Indians who are Ônot gangs of savagesÕ but instead Ôa people for ages civilised and cultivated; cultivated by all the arts of polished life, whilst we were yet in the woodsÕ (quoted in Fidler and Welsh 1999: 23) .
Thus Burke invoked a sense of common humanity to argue for universal justice based on the twin principles of liberty and equality, which can be discerned in different cultures and civilisations.
More generally, BurkeÕs speeches and writings both before and after the French Revolution were governed by a number of classical and Christian principles embodied Ð albeit imperfectly Ð in certain institutions and practices: the idea of local government that educates the citizenry to participate in the public realm; the idea of parliamentary scrutiny of government; the proportional participation of all classes of working people Ð not just property owners Ð in the affairs of the state; the right of the people to resistance as a last resort against unjustified tyranny; the idea of blending both authority and freedom by conceptualising the latter not as a rational right of the individual but rather as a system of both duties and privileges; the need for a renewable aristocracy that admits to its rank outstanding citizens and can thus assume the responsible leadership of the state with a view to the common good.
While for Burke history is contingent and particular, it nevertheless discloses normative and universal standards that are ultimately the work of God. The case of the French Revolution occupied him so deeply because it revealed the violation of the idea of common humanity and universal justice in the name of a perverted philosophy with its oscillation between dogmatic rationalism and impoverished empiricism. At the heart of his critique was the argument that the French Revolution represents a theoretically justified despotism that is even worse than the worst excesses of the ancient rŽgime. That is because it combines an abstract rationalism, which views humankind as disembedded from both nature and culture and which reduces society to a mechanical structure, with a proto-positivist commitment to absolute equality, which equates the citizenry with a homogenous mass of lone egos driven purely by self-interest.
The unique contribution of BurkeÕs associationist approach to IR is to highlight the false choice between the divine absolutism of the ancient rŽgime and the secular tyranny of revolutionary
France. Whereas the former failed to guarantee individual liberty and provide popular participation in government, the latter elevated the Ôwill of the peopleÕ above the classical and Christian idea of a balance of power without which there can be no plural polity. Despite these and other differences, both the old absolutism and the new tyranny were united in undermining the mediating institutions between the citizen and the state, bringing guilds, councils and corporations under direct central control. This left society atomised and individuals in a state of anomie, stripped of any real possibility for local self-government and personal affiliation to intermediary groups that are democratically self-governing. In short, Burked offered a qualified defence of perennial principles transmitted from Antiquity via the Middle Ages and the Renaissance to the modern era because they reflected universal standards of common humanity and justice and also provided a better yardstick for both political action and policy.
BurkeÕs associationist approach in question
This section discusses two possible objections to BurkeÕs conception of the international: first of all, the claim that BurkeÕs position does not differ fundamentally from that of Grotius and that therefore
Burke can be seen as part of the rationalist tradition of international theory (Wight 1991) . Secondly, that BurkeÕs emphasis on culture and association might ignore problems ranging from an essentialist conception of identity to a lack of relevance in todayÕs predominantly secular international system.
On the fundamental differences between Grotius and Burke
At first, BurkeÕs approach seems to echo GrotiusÕ political theology, as both thinkers reject the nominalist and voluntarist conception of God and the cosmic-political order (Burke 1993c; Grotius 2006 Grotius : 20-31, 2012 (Burke 1993c; Grotius 1988 ). These and other similarities have led a number of scholars, including Martin Wight, to suggest that Burke is part of the rationalist tradition of IR thinking (Bull 1966; Wight 1991 ; in a much more qualified way, Vincent 1984) .
However, Grotius Ð as an Arminian Calvinist Ð developed a rationalist theology that in many ways runs counter to BurkeÕs thought. First of all, GrotiusÕ theology had the effect of sundering the natural light of reason from the supernatural light of faith and also separating rationality from feeling, habit, and the imagination (a separation that thinkers of the Renaissance and, later, Burke,
T.H. Green and R.G. Collingwood sought to overcome). Connected with Grotian rationalism is his emphasis on the formality of the law as the main mediation between individuals within domestic politics and among states in the realm of international relations. This follows directly from his theological argument that God reigns over humankind by legislative command rather than by the outflow of love and the example of virtue embodied in Christ (Grotius 1988: 106-112; Grotius 1990; Grotius 2001: 159-263) . The contrast with BurkeÕs accentuation of virtue and sympathy could hardly be more marked.
It is true that Grotius does define states as particular instantiations of a larger unity which he describes in terms of the universal society established by nature. 2 However, he nevertheless views this unity in primarily formal, legal terms Ð not a ÔthickÕ, substantive conception of the common good that includes yet also transcends law (as for Burke) . Shaped by the experience of the religious wars and by intra-confessional disputes internal to Dutch Calvinism, Grotius invoked natural rights as a means to restore an original community of humankind that was destroyed by original sin and It is the case that there was still a significant step from GrotiusÕ formalist conception of an international society of states to HobbesÕ anarchical Ôstate of natureÕ, but what binds them together is the rationalist primacy of formally sovereign individuals and states over a more mutualist cosmic-political order. BurkeÕs attempt to renew just such a conception marks him out as a distinct thinker who cannot easily be categorised according to WightÕs typology of the three (admittedly permeable) traditions of international theory Ð realism, rationalism and revolutionism (Wight 1991; cf. Bull 1966) . Vincent claims that Burke was all of them. He was a realist, for example, in recognizing that the balance of power was as much Ôan engine subservient to the designs of interested and ambitious personsÕ as a preserver of the unity of the international system. He was a rationalist in his belief in Ôobligations written in the heartÕ. And he was a revolutionist in signing up with the counter-Reformation.
However, VincentÕs verdict ignores BurkeÕs repeated argument that power requires a higher authority than individual will or raison dÕŽtat and that a balance of power can only preserve the unity of the international system if it reflects standards of common humanity and universal justice.
Moreover, BurkeÕs invocation of Ôobligations written in the heartÕ shifts the emphasis from rationalist arguments about laws, treaties and contract towards cultural practices that are foreign to rationalism. And BurkeÕs search for a middle path means that he kept a clear distance vis-ˆ-vis the worst excesses of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation alike, as well as the ancient rŽgime and the French Revolution, so the label of ÔrevolutionistÕ makes little sense.
BoucherÕs conclusion about Burke is much more accurate: Ôin the case of Burke we find the differing elements in constant tension, but because of his anti-rationalism and dislike for arbitrary power, in whatever sphere it may be exercised, we find that the historical criterion of state conduct wins out over the others [rationalism and idealism/revolutionism], but not always convincingly, nor unequivocallyÕ (Boucher 1991: 148) . Boucher is right about the lack of a clear and distinct position and indeed a certain ambiguity in BurkeÕs thinking, but there are a number of constants that do run through his speeches and writings, as section two of this paper suggested.
On essentialism and a lack of relevance
Was Burke an essentialist? And did he bequeath to us a conception of identity that is exclusivist and might legitimate a culturalised and even racialist politics of populism? There is no doubt that in an important sense Burke was a committed imperialist who spoke the language of Ôgovernors and governedÕ, imperialist rulers and their subjects, the ÔEuropean gentlemanÕ and the natives of India, as well as the Ôspirit of religionÕ and the Ôspirit of commerceÕ. These and other formulations seem to lend credence to the claim that Burke subscribed to a static and immutable identity, dividing humanity into exclusive groups based on cultural homogeneity. And it is certainly the case that has not merely sociological significance but also concerns ontological questions about human nature that are perennial problems Ð including the propensity for both vice and virtue.
Specifically, BurkeÕs ideas can help political and IR theory to rethink the potential for solidarity amid the process of globalisation and its blurring of the domestic and the international.
BurkeÕs reflections are a reminder that both political action and economic activity not only take place in a social context but often build on a complex set of historical, legal, moral and religious factors, which underpin cooperation and solidarity and which globalisation can either foster or undermine. As Fidler and Welsh (1999: 67) conclude, Ôwhether globalization helps transform the 'papers and seals' between states into 'obligations written in the hearts' of culturally heterogeneous peoples constitutes one of the great but enigmatic questions for the new millenniumÕ. BurkeÕs notion of cultural commonwealths is one way to conceptualise the combination of cultural diversity with a commitment to universal standards of humanity and justice around Ôprincipled practicesÕ of mutual recognition, social freedom, generosity, loyalty and friendship.
Far from reducing a polity to some essentialist identity, Burke argues that both political institutions and cultural customs evolve over time and are therefore able to adapt to change in ways that uphold civilised life rather than sliding into barbarism. For example, BurkeÕs injunction to search for a middle path can help avoid extremes such as individualism and nationalism in favour of more mutual arrangements based on new, shared identities. This involves seeing our fundamental identity beyond our individual selves and making personal sacrifices so that new, shared identities may be built and strengthened. Society is a covenant between generations that based on the right institutions and practices can balance freedom and autonomy with solidarity and care for others.
One way to apply BurkeÕs thought today is to suggest that a society, which reflects humankindÕs social and relational nature, rejects the cult of rampant individualism and arbitrary restrictions on freedom that come with the cult of nationalism.
A closely connected objection is that BurkeÕs emphasis on Ôcustoms, manners and habit of lifeÕ cannot help construct a more just international order than the one that is currently dominant.
One critique of Burke (and this essayÕs reading of him) is that in the contemporary world, the bulk of political, economic and social transactions do occur at armsÕ length and that therefore Burke is wrong to focus on mutual obligations embodied in interpersonal relations because these are not more primary than abstract, formal and procedural standards upon which state and market processes rest. On the contrary, such standards real and they are desirable for the functioning of the international system. However, the counter-argument is that BurkeÕs point about Ôcommon cultureÕ stands: rights, contracts and the law (both domestic and international) on which they rest involve questions of culture, social relations and shared norms. For example, international law is interpreted and applied very differently depending on the cultural context, as in the case of certain Westerns states and countries such as Russia or China on questions of national sovereignty versus foreign intervention. Leaving aside double standards, there is a clash of cultures (not civilisations) between a more liberal cosmopolitan outlook and a more conservative national outlook. Neither culture is able to create the conditions for trust and cooperation within the international system, while the imposition of one on the other will almost inevitable lead to violent conflict.
BurkeÕs appeal to shared norms embedded in customs across different civilisations is one way to find common ground in an increasingly heterogeneous mix of cultures and religions. Indeed, Burke urges us to think together plurality based on universal principles that are embodied in practices as an alterative to hegemony based on particular cultural values that are imposed on others. As Vincent (1984: 214) writes, Ôthe raising of questions about the cultural underpinnings of the international political system can be placed in a Burkean tradition, and his own work remains a fruitful source for their investigationÕ. Crucially, one of BurkeÕs contribution to political and IR theory is to encourage a search for a ÔthickerÕ shared culture based on substantive (not merely procedural) values, and in the contemporary context this remains a key conceptual task.
Concluding reflection
This paper has argued that much of modern political and IR theory rests on a shared foundational premise Ð the idea that domestic politics and international relations are characterised by an original condition of anarchy, which can only be regulated by the artifice of a formal social contract and a systems of sovereign states governed by formal law. By contrast, the paper has tried to show that work of Edmund Burke provides an alternative conception of the international that focuses on the primacy of association Ð cultural and social bonds that are more primary than the social contract or the inter-state system of treaties and international law. Burke views associative ties not as socially constructed but rather as reflecting a natural order composed of custom, tradition and ultimately divine providence. Such an order gives rise to Ôcommonwealths of nationsÕ governed by a transcendent morality that for Burke is God-given. Identity is an organically evolving reality that is shaped by both ideas and material forces Ð notions of common humanity and universal standards of justice, which are mediated through history and embodied in particular practices of culture and human habit.
In terms of future research, three areas are of particular importance for IR theory. 
